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We examine the determinants of multinational firms’ location choices in Europe by
estimating a nested logit model on a data-set of 5,761 foreign subsidiaries established in
55 regions in 8 EU countries over the period 1991-1999. We find that firms perceive
regions across different countries as more similar than regions within national borders.
This might be revealing that the process of European integration has reduced the
national specificities perceived by multinationals and that regions within Europe
compete to attract FDIs more across than within countries. Controlling for regional
market size and potential, agglomeration economies and labor markets conditions, we
also find that EU regional policy, captured by Cohesion Funds and Objective 1
eligibility, played a significant role in attracting multinationals, thus mitigating the
agglomeration forces at work. Differences emerge in determinants of EU and US
multinationals location choices, with special reference to the role of labor markets. 
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21. Introduction
Accelerating economic integration in Europe over the past decade has favored, inter alia, a
significant flow of international investments from both within and outside the European Union
(EU) borders. As a matter of fact, the EU has attracted over 40% of total world flows of foreign
direct investments (FDIs) in the 1990’s, becoming the largest recipient of multinational
activity; multinationals account for a growing share of gross fixed capital formation in Europe
(from 6% in 1990 to over 50% in 2000); and about one quarter of large firm R&D carried out in
Europe has been conducted under foreign ownership, while the world average is just over one
tenth. 
However, this increasing inflow of FDI in Europe has not been equally distributed across
countries and regions. In this perspective, this paper analyses patterns and determinants of the
location of multinational activities in Europe over the nineties. In particular, we will focus on
the role of European integration and of EU policies in MNEs location choices in European
regions. 
First, we try to assess whether national boundaries affect location choices of multinational
firms. In fact, one could expect that European integration with the dismantling of trade barriers,
free movement of people, goods and capital and the strong reduction of state aids, have
contributed in making country boundaries more blurred
1. In this regard, Fatàs (1997) suggests
that national borders have seen their economic significance reduced over time as the process of
integration has contributed increasing cross-border correlations in regional business cycles
within the European Union. However, other empirical studies seem to suggest that country
effects still play a role in determining,  inter alia, regional growth in income per capita
(Rodriguez-Pose, 1999) and trade flows (Head and Mayer, 2000) in Europe. A few studies have
addressed  the issue of national boundaries in localization decisions, but results are largely
1 This is consistent with the argument put forth by  Krugman (1991, p.8): “as Europe becomes a unified
market, with free movement of capital and labor, it will make less and less sense to think of the relations
between its component nations in terms of the standard paradigm of international trade. Instead the issues
will be those of regional economics”.
3inconclusive as they have focused on specific categories of investors, such as Japanese or
French multinationals (Head and Mayer 2002, Mucchielli and Puech 2002). Then, one could
expect a variety of possible outcomes from economic integration processes, ranging from
persisting national patterns of localization of foreign activities, to the emergence of sub-
continental regions competing with each other across and within states for attracting foreign
economic activities. Assessing the role of national boundaries in the location of foreign
investments is highly relevant for policy. In fact it enables to identify the proper level of
intervention (whether national, regional or supra-national) for the selection, control and support
of multinational activities in Europe. 
Second, we will focus on the role of EU policies (Structural and Cohesion Funds) as tools to
attract foreign investors in backward regions. As noted in many recent theoretical and empirical
works, in presence of increasing returns and local externalities, a greater economic integration
leads to the spatial concentration of productive activities (Barrel and Pain 1999, Ciccone 2002,
Fujiita, Krugman and Venables 1999, Martin 1999, Puga, 2001). The uneven spatial impact of
economic integration motivates EU public support in favor of backward regions. Structural and
Cohesion Funds aim to contrast this trend towards productive localization in core regions by
creating favorable environmental conditions in the peripheral areas “thorough investment to
strengthen the economic base in recipient regions” (EC 1996). Using aggregate data on regional
gross value added, Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) show that European Structural
Funds expenditure influenced the location of industry in Europe, thus mitigating the economic
forces at work. Here, using micro data on multinational firms, we analyze whether and to what
extent   EU  policies  have  affected  the   localisation  of  multinational  activities  within  the
continent
2. 
2 It is worth pointing out that, by assessing the impact  of regional policies on the location of foreign
investment, we are not trying to assess whether the geographic distribution of multinational activity
eventually contributed to Europe’s economic growth or regional cohesion. For a recent discussion of the
impact of Structural and Cohesion Funds on regional convergence, see Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi,
2004).
4The analysis makes use of the Elios dataset (European Linkages and Ownership Structure),
built at the University of Urbino and based on Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom, which
provides information on location choices of 5,761 affiliates of multinational firms between
1991 and 1999 over a set of 55 regions in 8 EU countries (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Spain, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom). Parent companies are of different nationalities:
the single largest home country are the US (25%), but the majority are from EU countries
(60%). Additional  data on regional  and country characteristics  are  mainly drawn from
Eurostat’s Regio and Cambridge Econometrics. 
A nested logit model is used to evaluate whether national boundaries affect location
decisions and to what extent multinational firms consider regions belonging to different
countries as close substitutes. We single out a number of location determinants capturing the
role of regional market, agglomeration economies, experience of a multinational firm on each
regional market, local labor market characteristics and policy measures both at the EU level
(namely structural and cohesion funds) and at the national level (such as corporate tax rates and
public infrastructures). 
A number of previous studies address the determinants of location choices of foreign firms
in European regions. Head and Mayer (2002) and Mayer and Mucchielli (1999) focus on
Japanese investments, while Mucchielli and Puech (2002), and Disdier and Mayer (2002) deal
with the location choice of French firms in Europe
3. Other studies have also analyzed the
location determinants of FDIs within single European countries (see, for example, Basile
(2003) and Mariotti and Piscitello (1995) for the case of Italy; Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli
(2003), for the case of France; Barrios, Gorg and Strobl (2002) for the case of Ireland;
Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000) for Portugal; Devereux, Griffith and Simpson
(2003) for the United Kingdom). 
3 Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003) and Barrel and Pain (1999) analyze location of US investments in
European countries, but do not address the regional dimension. 
5This paper improves on the existing empirical literature from at least three points of view.
First, this work extends the geographic span of host economies, covering a larger number of EU
recipient countries than most previous contributions. Second, we are able to investigate how the
nationality of the parent firm will determine a different sensitiveness to some location
characteristics. Finally, we introduce a measure of firm’s previous experience of regions based
on the number of the established subsidiaries of the same group in a given location, which
allows to capture persistence as well as the tendency of foreign firms to cluster in specific
areas. 
The main results of our analysis are that: (i) country borders do not matters, except for the
case of Italy; (ii) EU policy contributed to mitigating agglomeration forces and attracted
considerable investments in peripheral regions; (iii) labor market characteristics attract EU and
US investments differently. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and illustrates the regional
distribution of new foreign establishments in Europe over the nineties. Section 3 briefly
reviews  the literature  concerning the location  determinants  of foreign firms. Section  4
illustrates  the nested logit model used  for estimation.  Section 5 presents  the  variables
introduced in the econometric model. The empirical findings are discussed in Section 6, and
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Regional distribution of FDI in Europe
As recalled earlier, FDIs directed towards EU countries have grown remarkably over the last
decade. The flow of inward FDIs in Europe have increased by 14 times since 1990, reaching
808,519 millions Euros in 2000, and the cumulated flow over the period 1992-2002 amounts to
slightly less than 1.8 billions Euros (Eurostat, 2002), representing over 40% of world’s FDI
flows (UNCTAD, 2002). Within this context we analyse the determinants of location choices of
foreign multinationals in EU regions. Our analysis exploits a novel dataset, built at the
University of Urbino, which collects information from Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom
on a large sample of firms active in Europe. In particular, we have data on firms active in 8
6countries (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom),
which inter alia account for over 60% of total inward FDI flow in the EU. For each firm we
have information on name and country of the ultimate owner, sector of activity (2-digit SIC),
location, year of establishment. Exploiting the information on the country of the ultimate owner
we identified foreign-owned firms and we restricted our analysis to those which were
established over the 1991 to 1999 period. We ended up with a sample of 5,761 foreign-owned
firms locating in one of the 8 countries considered over 1991-1999. Consistently with
Eurostat’s Foreign Direct Investment Statistics (Eurostat 2002), which reports that 72% of total
inward FDIs over the nineties have been Intra-EU flow, 3,395 (out of 5,761) sample firms are
subsidiaries of EU MNEs. Further comforting the idea that our large sample is a good
representation of inward FDIs in the EU, the percentage distribution of foreign-owned firms in
our sample across countries is remarkably similar to the actual distribution of cumulated FDI
flows over the same period  as registered by Unctad (see Table 1). 
-- Table 1 about here --
Our analysis of location determinants of foreign-owned firms in Europe exploits the
information on the region of establishment of each firm in our sample. In many cases such
information was available at a rather fine level of aggregation (such as NUTS3 or even cities),
but we had to confine our focus on NUTS1 regions, since in some cases (such as for German
firms) this was the only available piece of information and also because this allows to keep
computational complexity tractable in the subsequent econometric analysis
4. Figure 1 illustrates
the set of regions that we use in our analysis and highlights regions which are eligible for
Objective 1 funds of the EU. 
In Figure 2 and 3 we show how regions differ in terms of two key determinants of FDI
attraction, namely market size and market potential. The former is proxied by gross value added
(GVA) of region i in 1991, while the latter is the sum of GVA of all regions j weighted by the
4 In three cases only one region has been identified in one country. In the case of Sweden and Portugal this
was due to the lack of more disaggregated data, while in the case of Ireland Nuts1 corresponds to the
whole country.
7inverse of the (euclidean) distance from the largest cities in regions i and j
5. It is not surprising
that larger markets are regions in Western Germany (in particular Bayern, Baden-Wurttemberg,
Nordrhein-Westfalen), France and Northern Italy, Catalunia in Spain and South East in the UK,
while market potential is higher in Core regions and decreases with distance from Continental
Europe. 
The distribution of foreign investments (as proxied by the number of foreign-owned firms
established over 1991-1999) in EU regions, reported in Figure 4, suggests that larger regions
attract more FDIs. However, once controlled for market potential (Figure 6) some interesting
insights can be drawn. In particular, it emerges that some Peripheral regions, such as Ireland,
Scotland and Portugal have attracted considerably higher share of investments than the size of
their own market would suggest. This can have to do with the fact that EU policy towards
Objective 1 regions have contributed to attracting foreign investors. However, other Peripheral
regions, such as  the South of Italy, have attracted very few investments. This calls for a more
accurate analysis assessing the role of EU policy in attracting FDIs controlling for other sources
of regional heterogeneity. 
- Figure 1 - 6 about here -
At a closer look, one might notice that the case of Italy is characterized by very low numbers
of newly established subsidiaries in any region but Lombardia, while foreign presence is
generally more diffuse across regions in other EU countries. One may venture saying that in the
case of Italy a country effect is at play, decreasing the attractiveness of (almost) all regions
within the national boundaries. Conversely, French and German regions exhibit a similar,
relatively high, attractiveness, as measured by the number of new affiliates normalised to take
into account market size and market potential (see Figure 5).  Econometric results in Section 5
will shed further light on this aspect. 
Finally, interesting differences emerge in the location of EU MNEs relative to firms from
countries outside the EU (of which more than 50% are US MNEs). In particular, by comparing
5 This measure has been proposed by Harris (1954) and utilized inter alia in Head and Meyer (2002).
8Figures 5 and 6, it turns out that EU multinationals have a higher propensity to locate new
subsidiaries in Southern Europe and in the North-East of Italy; while non-EU multinationals
tend to locate their activities in Anglo-Saxon regions more than their EU counterparts. This
result suggests that determinants might differ according to the national origin of MNEs, so that
in the econometric analysis we will focus on location determinants for US MNEs as opposed to
EU MNEs. 
3. Location determinants of FDI
Location choices can be modeled as the outcome of a process where firms compare
alternative locations and choose the profit maximizing one. Within this context, theoretical
literature have identified a number of variables affecting firms’ profits. In this Section, we shall
discuss the hypotheses concerning the location determinants of foreign firms as suggested by
the more ‘traditional’ literature on firms’ location, by contributions which are more specific to
international investments, and by the ‘new economic geography’..
In the ‘traditional’ literature (see Beckman and Thisse, 1986), determinants of firms’
location choice comprise measures of costs and accessibility to production factors (labor and
raw materials), transportation costs, size and characteristics of the markets. If the investor
produces easily transportable goods, local demand has little influence on location decisions. By
considering the entire spatial area (Europe in our case) as its outlet market, the firm thus
chooses its location on the basis of cost considerations and, then, exports to nearby locations.
On the other hand, when transport costs are important, the local market size plays a major
attraction role. Classic contributions on foreign direct investments and multinational activities
have included ‘location specific’ factors as determinants of the geographical direction of
foreign   direct   investments   (Dunning   1981).   More   recently,   the   theory   of   international
production has highlighted that “horizontal” investments are likely to occur in locations where
markets are large and transport cost are high, while “vertical” investments arise when the cost
of labour and intermediate inputs is low (see Markusen, 1995 for a review).
9The traditional literature of location has also emphasized the role of regional promotion
incentives and of public infrastructures in affecting the firm’s cost function and thus its location
decision. Policy incentives may take different forms: (a) financial incentives (public subsidies),
(b) tax incentives, and (c) labor-promotion incentives.  With regards to the role of  public
infrastructure (e.g. roads, railways and telecommunications), different analyses show that
poorly infrastructured regions have relatively low levels of productivity and returns to private
investments which may indeed be smaller than in regions with better infrastructures
6. The
relatively low returns to private investments within poorly-infrastructured regions reduces their
attractiveness for both domestic and foreign investments.
7
The literature on foreign firms’ site selection has recently grown alongside with the
advances in the ‘new economic geography’ (Fujiita, Krugman and Venables 1999). Following a
typical cumulative causation approach, it is suggested that industrial firms tend to localize
where other firms of the same industry are present. The benefits of this form of externality –
connected with the number of manufacturing plants clustered in a specific area (agglomeration
economies) – are well known: namely, access to a more stable labor market, availability of
intermediate goods, production services and skilled manpower, and knowledge spillover
between adjacent firms. 
Admittedly,   agglomeration   economies   tend  to   reach  limit   values,  and  agglomeration
diseconomies eventually emerge. Firms operating in markets with relatively large numbers of
firms face stronger competition in product and labor markets. This acts as a centrifugal force
which tends to disperse activities in space. Once the centrifugal forces exceed the effects of the
agglomeration economies in a region, firms will look for locations in contiguous regions where
production costs are lower, while at the same time taking advantage to some degree of external
economies, given the short distances involved. In this case, agglomeration economies would
operate at a supra-regional level, giving rise to an external regional effect. This hypothesis is in
6  See, for example, Vickerman (1990).
7 Using data on FDIs from the US, Wheeler and Mody (1992) found that infrastructures play a major role
in US multinationals’ location decisions. 
10line with the process of progressive industrialization in the periphery proposed in Puga and
Venables (1996), where the distance between economies plays a role in selecting location. 
However, in the case of foreign-owned firms, agglomeration economies derive, not only
from the generic number of local incumbents, but also from the number of other foreign firms
operating in the same geographical area. As suggested by Head et al. (1999), “if foreign
investors - who have less initial knowledge about regional locations than their domestic
counterparts - only receive signals on costs and benefits of location decision, but face strong
difficulties in observing them directly, they might mimic each others’ location decision”.
Finally, agglomeration economies may be generated among firms belonging to the same
business group. The idea is that to the extent that firms gain experience and get acquainted with
a given context, uncertainty is likely to decrease and MNEs will perceive lower risks from
further investments (Castellani and Zanfei, 2003). As a result, MNE experience will determine
persistence in firms’ location choices.
4. The econometric model
As observed in the previous Section, location choices can be modelled as the outcome of
profit maximization. Firms choose to locate in the region which yields the highest expected
profit, conditional on observable variables which include the above mentioned factors (demand,
transportation costs, wages, accessibility to production factors, public incentive, infrastructure,
agglomeration economies/diseconomies). The most used econometric modelling technique for
this type of problem is the conditional logit model (CL) proposed by McFadden (1974). The CL
can   be   derived   from   profit   maximizing   firm   behaviour   under   appropriate   assumptions
concerning the stochastic term in the profit function
8. 
Each firm  i  obtains a profit  ij  from location  j  determined by a set of  observable
characteristics or attributes of the decision maker and the regions, which is captured by  a
8 Original formulations of CLM models are based on the consumer’s problem of utility maximization, but
extension to the firm’s problem is straightforward.
11deterministic part, Vij, and by some unobservable factors, which are captured by introducing a
stochastic term, ij. 
ij ij ij V     (1)
Firm i locates in region j if it yields a profit higher than all the alternative locations. In other
words, the probability that a firm i chooses to start up a plant in region j is 
    j k V V j y P ik ij ij ik ik ij i ij           , Pr Pr ) Pr(     (2)
Given the deterministic parts of the profit functions, this probability will depend on the
assumption on the distribution of the error term. McFadden (1974) shows that under the
assumption of independently and identically distributed error terms,  ij  , with type I extreme-
value distribution, the probability of choosing location j is: 




ij V V P 1exp exp (3)
It turns out that this model yields a globally concave likelihood function, and consequently
estimation is straightforward. A major problem with the CL model is the assumption of
independence of errors across choices. If two alternatives are similar, errors will likely be
positively correlated and CL parameters will be biased (Hess, 2002). In our context, the choice
of a firm of locating in regions within countries of the EU is very likely to suffer from such a
problem. For example, if some country effect occurs, one may argue that firms consider regions
within a country relatively similar, or at least that the degree of similarity of regions within a
country is higher than for regions of different countries. The nested logit model (NL) extends
the CL to overcome this problem. The basic idea is that alternatives can be grouped into nests,
according to their degree of similarity. Independence of the error terms holds outside the nests,
while positive correlation is allowed within each nest. 
Extension of the CL is straightforward. Let us assume that the J alternatives are grouped in
to K nests, that is each alternative j, belongs to a nest Bk. The profit function can be generalized
to: 
12k j i k i k j i k i ij Y W | , , | , ,        , for  k B j (4)
where Wik denotes profit deriving from every alternative within nest k, and Yik denote the
profit stemming the specific alternative j. The probability of choosing region j can thus be
expressed as the product of two probabilities: the probability of choosing region j conditional
on having chosen nest k times the marginal probability of choosing nest k,  k i k j i
NL
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Equation (7) can be estimated by maximum likelihood without many problems, but
complexity raises with the number of elemental choices (J) and nests (K) and with the number
of nesting levels. A key parameter in (7) is   k k k    /  . This coefficient, known as the
inclusive value parameter, since it is the estimated coefficient of IVik, can be interpreted as a
measure of the perceived dissimilarity between regions within a nest. In fact,  ) 1 ( k    turns out
to be a measure of correlation among the error terms within a nest. Therefore, a higher value of
k   means greater independence of the unobserved portion of profits among regions within the
9 See Hensher and Greene (2002), Hess (2002), Louviere, Hensher, Swait (2000), Train (2002).
13same nest. A value of  1  k   suggests complete independence. When  1  k   for all k the NL
collapses into the CL indicating that no nesting is necessary to improve the estimation and, in
our case, that foreign investors perceive all regions in the EU as close substitutes. Values of
1  k   suggest that regions within a nest are considered more dissimilar to regions within their
nest than to regions outside. This can be interpreted as evidence that the nesting structure is not
appropriate. In fact, as noted above, the goal of NL is to group similar alternatives together. In
these cases, estimates can be improved by trying a different nesting structure. 
Hensher and Greene (2002) notice that estimation requires some normalization in  k  , and
suggest to set the numerator to 1. In other words, the estimated IV parameters are  k  / 1 . This
solution is implemented in LIMDEP 7.0 and NLOGIT 3.0 under the option RU2, but the
reported coefficients are the  k  s. This implies that parameters in regression tables should be
interpreted in the following way: 
k  >1 means that regions within a nest are perceived as more similar than regions outside the
nest
k  <1 means that regions within a nest are perceived as more dissimilar than regions outside
the nest and suggests that the nesting structure is not appropriate
k  =1 means independence. If this condition occurs for all k, NL collapses into CL. 
5. Model specification and variable description
The NL model described in the previous section is implemented using a linear specification
of the profit function. From equation (4) 
ij ij ik ij k j i k i ij X Z Y W            | , , ,
where Z is a vector of country characteristics, and X is a vector of regional characteristics,
which eventually vary across firms. In both vectors, variables are lagged one year with respect
14to the dependent variable, which takes value 1 if a given subsidiary i was created in region j and
zero otherwise. 
Following the arguments developed in Section 2, the explanatory variables in vectors X and
Z may be grouped into five categories: market, agglomeration economies, local labor market,
European and national policy (see Table 2). 
- Table 2 about here -
(1) Market. Following Friedman et al. (1992), we measure the regional market with two
variables: lnYj, the log of GVA in that region, which proxies for the actual market size, and
lnYj’, the log of a distance weighted sum of GVA of all other regions, which captures market
potential. For a given region j, we calculate lnYj’ = lnk(Yk /djk), where djk is the Euclidean
distance
10 from the major cities in region j and region k.
11 A large market is expected to increase
profit that a multinational firm can extract from a region.
(2) Agglomeration economies. We use different measures of agglomeration to capture the
three different types of effects: overall agglomeration, foreign firms agglomeration and MNE
experience. Overall agglomeration economies are approximated by the log of the number of
manufacturing plants in the same industry (s) in each region (j), while the role of foreign firms
agglomeration in affecting the location choice of multinational firms is captured by the log of
the number of foreign-owned firms within region j and sector s. Agglomeration forces have
been found by virtually any recent study on foreign firms location choices. We allow also for a
spatial lag in both measures of agglomeration using the (log of the) sum of all (or only foreign)
firms in sector s in regions different from j, weighted by the inverse Euclidean distances. These
10 The distance matrix has been obtained from ArcView 3.2 and Spatial Analyst, using layers of the
administrative boundaries of the EU and population of European major cites.
11 Head and Mayer (2002) have proposed an alternative measure of market potential based on Krugman
(1992) model. In particular, they claim that the market potential variable must be discounted based on
bilateral trade impediments and adjusted to take into account the location of competitors. Empirically,
they find that market potential does matter for regional location choice of Japanese firms in the European
Union. However, they compare the effect of this new market potential variable with the one utilized in this
paper, and did not find significant differences.
15variables are expected to capture any congestion effect, which will discourage location in
highly agglomerated regions and favour establishment in regions nearby. The role of MNE
experience is captured by the log of the number of firms in region j controlled by the same
parent of firm  i.  Consistently with studies showing that MNE experience, by reducing
uncertainty, increase the likelihood of commitment intensive operations (such as the creation
new subsidiaries) (Castellani and Zanfei, 2003), we expect a positive sign on this variable.
(3) Local labor market. In measuring observable factor prices, we focus on wages. Wage is
measured by the (log of the) ratio between the labor costs and the number of employees at the
regional level. High wages would tend to discourage FDI inflows; however, it is also generally
acknowledged that high wages could indicate a high level of human capital and skilled workers.
Generally speaking, this double effect justifies the non-significance of the coefficient of the
wage variable found in many empirical studies on FDI location choice. 
We also include the log of tax wedge on labour, measured at the national level, since in
Europe there is no room for diversified fiscal treatments within countries. This variable has
been borrowed from Martinez-Mongay (2000). Following Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991,
page 209), the total wage wedge “is the gap between the real labour costs of the firm, on the
one hand, and the real post tax consumption wage of the worker, on the other”. The tax wedge
on labour measured by Martinez-Mongay (2000) is the difference between the gross wage
deflated by the producer’s price (real producer wage) and the gross wage net of social security
contributions and personal income taxes on labour income deflated by the consumer’s prices
(the real consumer wage). In line with De Santis, Mercuri and Vicarelli (2003) who find that
FDI inflows in the European Union are more influenced by the total fiscal wedge on labour
than by the corporate tax rate, we expect that the higher is the tax wedge on employment, the
lower is the attractiveness of a region. 
Finally, among labor market variables, we include the log of the regional unemployment rate
(percentage of labour force defined as unemployed at the regional level). As in the case of the
wage variable, no clear cut expectations can be formulated about the sign of unemployment
16coefficient. On the one hand, a high unemployment rate could increase the attractiveness of a
region by increasing the size of the job applicant pool; on the other hand, foreign firms may
interpret a high unemployment rate as a result of rigidities on the labor market. 
(4) National policy. We include the log of the national corporate tax rate (corporate income
tax revenues in national currency divided by nominal GDP in national currency), borrowed by
Gropp and Kostial (2000), and the log of a regional stock index of infrastructure developed by
Confindustria for the 1985. Both variables are under (almost) complete control of nation states
and can be expected to affect the profitability of regions. One might expect that a higher
corporate  tax rate  discourages investors,  while  better  infrastructure  should  increase  the
attractiveness of a region. However, empirical evidence on the impact of the tax rate on inward
FDI and foreign firms location choices is mixed (see Devereux and Griffith (2002, 2003) and
Benassy-Querè et al. (2000) for recent reviews). In fact, a number of issues arise when
estimating the effect of tax regimes on international investments. First, the correct measurement
of the effective corporate tax rate is not trivial given available data; second tax schemes differ
across countries (i.e. full credit vs exemption schemes); third, firms might “accept higher taxes
if they are associated with better infrastructures or public services” (Benassy-Querè et al.
(2000) p. 7), therefore tax differences could not matter for location decisions, if they simply
balance differences in public goods; fourth, agglomeration forces make tax competition too
costly because they can be counteracted only by very large differences in tax rates.
In recent years, many EU countries have adopted specific policy measures for attracting
FDIs, such as financial incentives to foreign firms and local development agencies which
implement specific activities to attract multinational firms (Piscitello, 1997). At this stage we
are unable to control for such national policies specific for foreign firms.
(5) European policy. While most individual countries have introduced specific incentives
targeted to multinational firms, the EU has no specific policy instrument ‘dedicated’ to the
attraction of foreign investments, and foreign firms benefit from ‘generic’ public incentives,
such as those co-financed by the European Union through the Structural and the Cohesion
17Funds. The amount of resources mobilized by the EU regional policies in the period 1989-99
contributed about 6.5% of annual Community GDP. As a reference point, one may consider
that the Marshall Plan aids, granted in the period 1948-51 for the post-war reconstruction in
Europe, was equivalent to 1% of US GDP per year. Structural Funds have different Objectives:
Objective 1 is the most important one and accounted for about two-thirds of total Structural
Funds allocated over the 1989-99 period. It is aimed at boosting the development of laggard
regions (that is regions with a per capita GDP lower than the 75% of the EU average). Cohesion
Funds are instead distributed to those countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece) with a per
capita GDP lower than the 90% of the European average (see Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi,
2004, for a recent discussion of EU regional policies).
The effect of European policy is captured by two variables: a dummy variable set to 1 when
the region receives Objective 1 Structural Funds; and a dummy variable set to 1 if the country
receives Cohesion Funds (namely, Spain, Ireland and Portugal; Greece is missing in our data
set). 
6. Regression results
In section 2 we described the regional distribution of foreign subsidiaries established by
multinational firms in Europe over the nineties and we noticed three things. First, larger and
richer regional markets account for the higher number of investments, but once controlled for
market size and potential, some (even though not all) laggard regions in the EU Periphery,
which were eligible for structural funds in the Objective 1, attracted a considerable number of
multinationals. This suggests that in order to test whether EU policies have played a role in
attracting FDIs one needs to control for other sources of attractiveness. Second, subsidiaries of
EU MNEs appear to establish new subsidiaries in Southern regions more than average, while
non EU MNEs are apparently more focused on Anglo-Saxon regions, indicating that some
specificities in investment orientations may also depend on the area of origin of MNEs. Third,
once controlled for market potential, there seems to exist extensive groups of regions belonging
to different countries which exhibit quite similar attractiveness, suggesting that MNEs do not
18seem to consider national borders as particularly relevant in taking their localisation decisions.
A remarkable exception is represented by Italy, wherein the setting up of new foreign
subsidiaries has been particularly low, over the examined period, with apparently no equivalent
in other areas of Europe.
In this Section we will pursue these issues further, by estimating a nested logit model which
allows both to address the question of whether national boundaries are perceived as relevant in
location decisions of multinational firms and to examine the impact of various determinants of
location. In Section 6.1 we will focus on the first question, while in Section 6.2 we will
consider the determinants of location, and in Section 6.3 we will compare the cases of EU and
US MNEs. 
6.1 Choosing the nesting structure. Do national boundaries matter?
As we anticipated in Section 4, the nested logit model improves on the standard conditional
logit by allowing different degrees of substitutability among regions. In particular, regions
which yield a similar profit can be grouped into common nests, improving the quality of
estimation. In this perspective, the choice of the nesting structure is crucial. As we noted above,
an appropriate nesting structure requires that μk>1 for all the K nests, suggesting that errors (i.e.
the stochastic component of profits) for the various regions within a nest are positively
correlated, or in other words, that regions within a nest are perceived as similar by investing
firms. Countries are the natural nests. Cultural specificities, barriers to trade and to the
movement of people should make regions belonging to the same country more similar than
regions from different nation states. Consistently with this view, Head and Meyer (2000) show
that markets within the EU are still significantly fragmented due to the consumers’ home bias.
However, one may argue that within the EU such differences have been declining over time, as
a result of the increasing economic and political integration. 
In table 3 we report the   parameters for various nesting structures. First notice that the
hypothesis that all regions within Europe are close substitutes, i.e. a test of the CL against the
NL, is rejected from a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test in all specifications. Therefore, some nesting
19is required. In columns (1), (5) and (9) we test the conjecture that regions are similar within
countries and we soundly reject it. In fact,  parameters are above 1 only for Italy (and for
Spain when attention is limited to EU MNEs (column 6))
12. In other words, a country effect
characterizes Italian regions. One may venture saying that, although differences do exist in
industrial structures of regions within Italy, a relatively advanced region like Emilia Romagna
is perceived by US MNEs as more similar to Italy’s Mezzogiorno than to Baden-Wurttenberg,
while the latter is considered more similar to Ile de France than to the Berlin region. This result
provides some more robust explanation to the fact that almost all Italian regions attract a
remarkably lower number of investors than other EU regions. Furthermore, this evidence seems
to suggest that, apart from the case of Italy, multinational firms tend to consider the EU as a
geo-economic space, not as a sum of independent countries
13. Then, combining this result with
Head and Mayer (2000), who find that the EU market is still fragmented due to the persistence
of a home country bias in consumers’ preferences, one could venture saying that European
integration  is   far   more   advanced  in  firms’  perceptions   and  location   decisions   than   in
consumers’ preferences. 
Having said that national borders do not (generally) affect location decisions of MNEs, one
needs to find the appropriate aggregation of regions. As noted by Louviere et al. (2000) many
nesting structures are plausible and it is difficult to assess to what extent one is better than the
other in behavioral/statistical terms. It is worth stressing that it is beyond the purpose of this
paper to single out a one best nesting structure. We rather need to test and see whether some
aggregations of regions which appear to make sense from a socio-economic point of view are
also characterized by a degree of internal similarity (in terms of profits firms can extract from
12 Notice that IV parameters are fixed to 1 in the cases of Ireland, Sweden and Portugal since these nests
contain only one region. They are the so-called degenerate nests.
13 Mayer and Mucchielli (1999) find that in the case of Japanese investors national borders seem to matter.
We believe that the different results reached in this paper are due to the fact that we consider investors
from many countries and in particular we include EU and US MNEs. Results  for Japanese MNEs in our
sample are consistent with Mayer and Mucchielli (1999) but, given the relatively low number of
observations, estimates are not robust and are not shown.
20localizing their activities) that is higher than in the case of national aggregates; so that we can
get consistent estimates of the various location determinants. In this perspective, we choose to
follow two distinct directions in aggregating regions and stop when a satisfying result is
reached. First, we aggregated countries with similar geo-economic characteristics. Second, we
aggregated regions according to a Core/Periphery model. Within the first line of analysis we
started by creating two broad nests, which group together regions belonging to Northern
countries (UK, Ireland, Sweden, France and Germany) and to Southern ones (Italy, Portugal
and Spain). See columns 2, 6 and 10 for a test on this nesting structure. This structure seems
appropriate for Southern regions but not for the Northern group, so we split this group into one
for Anglo-Saxon (UK and Ireland) and one for Continental countries (France, Germany and
Sweden). This nesting structure seems appropriate both for the whole sample of investors and
for EU and US MNEs since all  parameters are well above 1 (Column (3), (7) and (11)). In
other words, we support the view that multinational firms consider Iberic and Italian regions
closer substitutes with each other than with German, French or UK regions. Similarly, French
regions are perceived as more similar to German ones, but different from UK regions. 
As far as the second direction for the search of the appropriate nesting is concerned, results
support a Core/Periphery model as well. In fact, regions eligible for Objective 1 funds are more
closely substitute for each others, and are different from non-Objective 1 regions. 
Then, we have found at least two appropriate nesting structures (among many possible
alternatives), but in the following analysis of the determinants of MNEs location choices we
will rely on the Anglo-Continent-South because it allows to capture the effect of EU policy
(which we proxy with a dummy for regions eligible for Objective 1 funds). Let us just stress
once more that the main goal of this section was not to identify the best nesting structure.
Rather we aimed at assessing if we could reject a structure based on national boundaries or, in
other words, if we could exclude that country borders play a key role in the choice of the
regions where MNEs set up their European operations. Indeed, results suggest that such country
effect is relevant only for the case of Italy.
216.2 Determinants of the location of foreign firms in EU regions
In Section 2 we showed that, controlling for market size and market potential, some regions
eligible for Objective 1 funds attracted a considerable number of foreign subsidiaries. Results
in Table 4 shed further light on this aspect, using the “nesting structure” selected in the
previous section (i.e. Anglo-Continent-South) and controlling for a number of exogenous
sources of heterogeneity. Columns (1) and (2) show that controlling only for demand and
policy, Objective 1 regions are not more attractive than other regions. However, when
controlling for other determinants of the location choice, such as agglomeration and labor
market conditions, the effect of Objective 1 turns substantially positive (Columns 3 and 4)
14.
We interpret this result as evidence that EU policies have contributed to mitigating centripetal
agglomeration   forces   and   have   attracted   multinationals   towards   peripheral   regions.
Furthermore, it is worth recalling that in Section 6.1 we supported the view that a nesting
structure based on the eligibility for Objective 1 was not rejected. In other words, firms
perceive regions within the administrative boundaries defined by EU policy for structural funds
more similar than regions within national boundaries.
As regards other policy variables, one notices that Cohesion funds have possibly made some
countries   significantly   more   attractive   than   others,   while   infrastructures   turn   out   non
significant. However, this is not very surprising, given the strong correlation of this latter
variable with market size and agglomeration. In fact, if we do not control for market size in
column (2), infrastructure would turn positive. The corporate tax rate does not seem to have a
14 It is worth mentioning that this result is robust to a number of sensitivity tests. First, we ran a regression
using the total amount of structural funds allocated over the 1989-1993 period (Columns (5), which turns
out positive and significant. Noticeably, funds allocated to Objective 1 regions have an even higher
impact on the attractiveness of regions (Column (6)). However, the use of continuous variables instead of
the dummy (Objective 1 regions) to test the impact of EU policy, is not costless. Indeed, due to the lack of
data, we had to drop investments in Eastern Germany from regressions in columns 5 and 6 . Second, we
dropped investments in Portugal, which (as reported by Table 1) might be overrepresented in our sample
and inflate the effect of the Objective 1 dummy. Third, we considered Scotland as non eligible for
Objective 1 funds, since only a limited proportion of the region is indeed eligible (The Highlands).
Results are not affected by these changes and are available from the authors upon request.  
22strong impact in discouraging foreign investments. On the contrary, it bears a positive and
significant effect. This result supports the view that high tax rates might not discourage foreign
investors whenever governments compensate the higher cost with some public good (Devereux
and Griffith (2002, 2003) and Benassy-Querè et al. (2000)) as it might happen in Cohesion
countries. Caution is needed when interpreting this result, given that we are not able to control
for incentives specific to foreign firms, which some countries put into practice in the nineties.
Nevertheless, one may want to notice that if we drop the cohesion dummy in column (2), the
sign of the corporate tax rate turns negative and significant. This is consistent with the fact that
a number of Regions within Cohesion countries (like Portugal and Catalunia) having relatively
high corporate tax rates attract about the same amount of subsidiaries (as a share of market
potential) as Ireland, having a much lower corporate tax rate (10% as compared to 35-40% in
Iberic countries). Conversely, in non-Cohesion countries, high tax regions in Germany attract
more subsidiaries than UK regions (characterized by a relatively low tax rate). However, in the
richest specification, dropping the cohesion dummy does not change the sign and magnitude of
the corporate tax rate, which remain positive and significant. 
As concerns other control variables, our tests confirm that demand and agglomeration
economies increase the attractiveness of regions, but other results also emerge from the
introduction of our proxy of firm-specific agglomeration economies (i.e. MNE experience). In
fact, we find that the profit that a MNE receives from a given region is highly responsive to the
number of subsidiaries of the same parent. In other words, experience of a given context
increases firms’ ability of extracting profit from that region and determines a persistency to
locate in the same regions. This has important policy implications. While agglomeration
economies usually create problems to policy makers because of threshold levels needed to
induce virtuous cycles, and thus require substantial investments for attracting a considerable
number of firms, targeted incentives to specific firms might induce them to get rooted in a
given context and increase the likelihood of further investments of the same MNE. Eventually,
this might attract other firms and create the basis for an agglomerating mechanism. 
236.3  US versus EU MNEs
In Section 2 we noticed that EU and non EU MNEs seem to follow different location
patterns. In Table 5 we investigate this issue further, singling out the role of the most important
component of non-EU foreign investors, i.e. US multinationals, and we estimate our richest
specification for the two groups of MNEs. Most variables keep their sign and magnitude but
two significant differences emerge. First, corporate tax rate is positive and significant for EU
MNEs, while it is non-significant for US MNEs. This is consistent with the view that US firms
are more sensitive to corporate tax rates, probably because the actual tax differential is on
average higher than for EU MNEs, which tend to pay relatively higher taxes in their home
countries
15. Second, labor market conditions have a remarkably different impact on the
attractiveness of regions in the case of US MNEs as opposed to EU MNEs. In fact, from Table
5 one notices that a high tax wedge on employment discourages investment from US MNEs
significantly, while high wages have the opposite effect. This might suggest that US firms look
for skilled workers and are willing to pay them higher wages, but are not willing to grant
government high taxes on employed labor. Conversely, EU MNEs place more emphasis on
unemployment, consistently with the idea that intra-EU investments are part of a strategy of
reorganization of international activities where the local availability of cheap labor plays a role.
One may argue that this can have to do with the different characteristics of US and EU
investors. In particular, investments in high-tech sectors are far more frequent for the former.
Affiliates in high-tech industries account for 34% of total US affiliates in our sample, while in
the case of EU MNEs the share drops to 22%. Regressions on sub-samples based on the
characteristics of the industries
16 where affiliates are created confirm that the impact of wages
is positive and significant only in high-tech industries. However, neither in low nor in stable-
tech industries wages have a negative and significant impact on location choices.
15 In the light of the discussion above, the fact the impact of Cohesion seems not relevant for US firms can
be consistent with this difference.
16 We classify every affiliates as high-tech, stable-tech and low-tech, converting the 4 digit-SIC code of
each firm, using a correspondence table provided by Hall and Vopel (1997).
247. Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed the determinants of location choices of multinational firms in
European regions. Most of previous studies focused on location decisions within single
countries, often analyzing location at a rather geographically disaggregated level, but making
the hypothesis that firms choose regions within and not across countries. In other words, firms
are usually assumed to choose countries first and then decide in which region within that
country they locate their activities. The process of European integration is making this
perspective rather narrow, since regions can be expected to compete to attract FDIs with other
regions both within and across national boundaries. This study provides empirical support to
the view that country boundaries do not matter and that EU policy contributed to attract
considerable investments in Peripheral regions, counteracting agglomerative forces which tend
to concentrate activities in Core regions. In fact, on the one hand, we find that multinational
firms consider regions across countries as closer substitutes than regions within national
boundaries. This suggests that when taking location decisions, multinational firms perceive the
EU as a relatively (albeit  not  completely)  integrated  area,  rather  than  a  collection  of
independent countries. However, Italy turns out as a special case. In fact, US MNEs perceive a
strong country effect when locating in Italian regions, suggesting that US firms take their
location   decision   on   a   presumption   that   investments   in   Italian   regions   would   yield
systematically lower profits than investment in regions from other countries sharing similar
observable characteristics.  Quoting a recent article appeared in a US newspaper (“Italian
Puzzle: The Land That Doesn’t Seem To Fit”, The New York Times, August 20, 2003): “Italy
has occupied an odd place in Europe, to potent to be ignored, but too peculiar to be embraced”.
Institutional characteristics which are largely unobservable at least in a reliable way, when
comparing   countries   and   regions,   such   as   political   instability,   inefficiencies   in   public
administration, market regulation, have certainly played a role. However, this country effect is
not as strong when considering the sub-sample of EU multinationals. In this perspective, one
may think that, apart from greater cultural similarities, EU integration, increasing mobility of
25people and trade in goods and services across European countries, have contributed increasing
information flows and knowledge thus reducing such a presumption of peculiarity of Italy at
least in the case of EU MNEs, as opposed to US ones.
We also find that regions eligible for Objective 1 Structural Funds and regions
belonging to Cohesion countries are particularly attractive for foreign multinationals. This
supports the view that EU regional policy, creating more favourable conditions for investments
in Peripheral  regions  through funding (among others)  training, infrastructure  and R&D
activities, have succeeded in counteracting agglomerative forces which tend to concentrate
activities in Core regions. However, further work is required along these lines. First, one would
like to control for more direct measures of EU policies, such as the actual amount of funds
transferred to the various regions for different activities, e.g. training, infrastructures and R&D.
Second, careful measurement of national and regional policies specifically targeted to foreign
investments is required, in order to assess the differential impact of EU versus national and
regional policies correctly. Third, further investigation should be devoted to assess whether the
EU Structural and Cohesion Funds have eventually been distorting the efficient allocation of
multinational activity in Europe. 
Finally, we find important differences among investors. In particular, US and EU
MNEs are attracted by very different labour market conditions. While both groups of firms are
not attracted by low wages, US firms seem to place high value on highly skilled workers and
are thus willing to pay higher wages (but are strongly discouraged by taxes on labour), EU
MNEs are attracted towards regions with relatively higher unemployment rates. This might
suggest that US MNEs carry out higher value added activities in the EU.
Table 1 – Newly established subsidiaries and inward FDI flows in selected EU countries
over the nineties

















France 598 269 143 26 867 15.0% 18.1% 263,873
Germany 965 655 361 39 1620 28.1% 21.8% 318,414
Ireland 42 35 26 5 77 1.3% 4.3% 62,274
Italy 202 93 53 12 295 5.1% 3.6% 52,875
Portugal 151 27 13 5 178 3.1% 1.7% 25,227
Spain 368 116 68 19 484 8.4% 9.8% 143,831
Sweden 96 56 19 2 152 2.6% 10.5% 152,753
Uk 973 1115 760 108 2088 36.2% 30.2% 441,315
Total 3395 2366 1443 216 5761 100.0% 100% 1,460,560
Source: * Authors’ elaborations on Who Owns Whom 
** UNCTAD (http://stats.unctad.org/fdi)
Table 2 - Variable List and Description  
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otherwise Region
Cohesion country 1 if the country receives Cohesion
Fund, 0 otherwise Country
National policy
Public Infrastructure Index of infrastructure stock in
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27Table 3 – Location determinants of FDI in Europe. Nested Logit Regressions. Choosing the nesting structure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

















UK .874** .887** .956**
France .818** .790** 1.008**
Germany .795** .792** .860**
Italy 1.082** 1.035** 1.369**
Spain .997** 1.028** .989**
Ireland 1.000 1.000 1.000
Portugal 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sweden 1.000 1.000 1.000
North (UK-Ire-Fra-Ger-Swe) .854** .950** .841**
South (Italy-Portugal-Spain) 1.079** 1.216** 1.067**
Anglo (UK-Ireland) 1.173** 1.272** 1.176**
Continent (Fra-Ger-Swe) 1.020** 1.032** 1.111**
South (Italy-Portugal-Spain) 1.386** 1.393** 1.583**
Objective 1 1.753** 1.863** 1.547**
Non Objective 1 1.482** 1.549** 1.366**
Number of observations 294,794 294,794 294,794 294,794 164,664 164,664 164,664 164,664 79,365 79,365 79,365 79,365
Number of firms 5,761 5,761 5,761 5,761 3,395 3,395 3,395 3,395 1,443 1,443 1,443 1,443
Pseudo R
2 .263 .240 .203 .246 .245 .225 .202 .234 .315 .285 .221 .286








-4361.59 -4366.33 -4367.29 -4379.67








-4383.06 -4383.06 -4383.06 -4388.83
LR test: CL vs. NL 178.00** 153.04** 158.26** 98.02** 102.06** 83.88** 105.98** 84.5** 42.94** 33.46** 31.54** 18.32**
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in region j and zero for all regions different from j. Regressions have been run using the specification of column (4) in Table 4, except
(4), (8) and (12) where the dummy Objective 1 have been dropped..
Asterisks denote confidence levels: * p < .10 and ** p < .05.
28Table 4 – Location determinants of FDI in Europe. Nested Logit Regressions . All
foreign investors





































EU Structural Funds in Obj 1 Regions .026**
(.010)



























































































Anglo 1.135** 1.066** 1.043** 1.173** 1.132** 1.133**
Continent 1.541** 1.511** 1.027** 1.020** 1.030** 1.039**
South 2.680** 2.846** 1.307** 1.386** 1.318** 1.134**
Number of observations 294,794 294,794 294,794 294,794 257,006 257,006
Number of firms 5,761 5,761 5,761 5,761 5,509 5,509
Pseudo R
2 .130 .131 .201 .203 .207 .207
Log-likelihood -19976.50 -19953.14 -1832.01 -18303.55 -16916.68 -16912.64
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in region j and zero for all regions
different from j. 
Standard Errors  in parenthesis. Asterisks denote confidence levels: * p < .10 and ** p < .
05.
Table 5 – Location determinants of FDI in Europe. Nested Logit Regressions. by
country of origin and technological intensity





















































































































































Anglo 1.272** 1.176** 1.156** 1.047** 1.431**
Continent 1.032** 1.111** 1.108** .095** 1.206**
South 1.393** 1.583** 1.672** 1.174** 1.728**
Number of observations 164,664 79,365 80,496 137,282 77,016
Number of firms 3,395 1,443 1,557 2,710 1,494
Pseudo R
2 .202 .221 .228 .181 .231
Log-likelihood -10906.12 -4367.29 -4770.74 -8888,78 -4554.67
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in region j and zero for all regions
different from j. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. *denotes t-statistics at the 90% confidence level; **, at
95%
30Figure 1 - EU Nuts 1 regions by Objective 1 eligibility
Source: Elaborations on Elios (University of Urbino)
Figure 2 – Market size (regional GVA) at 1991
Source: Elaborations on Elios (University of Urbino)
31Figure 3 – Market potential (including own market size) at 1991
Source: Elaborations on Elios (University of Urbino)
Figure 4 - Number of subsidiaries established in 1991-1999 in EU Nuts 1 regions
Source: Elaborations on Elios (University of Urbino)
32Figure 5 - Number of foreign subsidiaries established in EU Nuts 1 regions (1991-1999)
as a share of market potential
Source: Elaborations on Elios (University of Urbino)
Figure 6 - Share of subsidiaries established by EU MNEs in EU Nuts 1 regions (1991-
1999)
33Source: Elaborations on Elios (University of Urbino)
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